China in 2010
Written by: Michael R. Fahey
Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
Population: (2010 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,338,085,000
Head of state: President Hu Jintao
Head of government: Premier Wen Jiabao
In 2010 China became the world’s second largest economy and held the Expo 2010 Shanghai China. (See Sidebar.) Domestically, China prepared for an expected leadership transition in 2012, while internationally it pursued a more confident foreign policy, particularly in East Asia.
Shanghai, China’s most advanced city and the centre of its economic miracle, hosted the exposition, which showcased the city and China’s concomitant rise to the country’s own citizens—much as the Beijing Olympics had done so to the world in 2008. Despite its tremendous success, the expo was criticized by author and former race car driver Han Han for overdeveloping Shanghai, when what the city really needed was greater openness and less control. A fire in a Shanghai apartment building that killed 58 people in mid-November also prompted criticism that Shanghai’s development had sacrificed the welfare and safety of its residents. Dissident artist and activist Ai Weiwei announced a citizen’s investigation of the fire. Ai had been placed briefly under house arrest earlier that month to prevent him from attending an art event he had planned in Shanghai. His installation work Sunflower Seeds was exhibited at the Tate Modern gallery in London, attracting a protest by an expatriate Chinese artist.
China tolerated little political dissent during the year as it prepared for a leadership transition in 2012. Prominent dissident and literary critic Liu Xiaobo was convicted of subversion and sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment at the end of 2009 for his part in the Charter 08 political-reform manifesto published in December 2008. Two other activists, Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren, were given shorter prison sentences in late 2009 and early 2010, respectively, for their efforts to expose official misfeasance after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
In contrast to the wave of repression earlier in the year, Premier Wen Jiabao in August voiced concerns about whether China’s political development was keeping up with its economic development. Symbolically, his call for political reform, although vague, was articulated during a speech marking the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, an event generally regarded as the beginning of China’s global economic rise.
For the foreseeable future, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appeared intent on remaining in political control and governing by party consensus rather than through elections. This was demonstrated when, in October, Political Bureau member Xi Jinping was named vice-chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission. The commission controlled China’s military politically, and Xi’s appointment was seen as an important stepping stone in the process for him to succeed Hu Jintao as China’s president when Hu’s term ended in 2012.
Just a few weeks before these leadership changes, however, the Chinese government was severely embarrassed when Liu was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. Condemning the award, the Chinese government reacted with a wave of repression that included the house arrest of Liu’s wife, overseas travel bans on academics, and restrictions on other prominent dissidents such Ding Ziling, the outspoken mother of a student killed during the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and Bao Tong, former secretary to purged premier Zhao Ziyang. The Chinese government called on foreign governments to boycott the ceremony. In its official media the Chinese government denounced the award as a “plot” against China and Liu as a “Chinese criminal” who was attempting to sabotage China’s political stability, rule of law, and economic progress.
Premier Wen was not the only voice calling for reform, however. In March, 11 Chinese newspapers simultaneously ran a joint editorial calling on the government to end the hukou system of household registration that effectively denied rural citizens the right to reside and work or for their children to attend schools in urban areas at a time when tens of millions of domestic migrants were living and working in China’s major cities. The one-child policy, another important social program from the past, was also questioned in 2010, prompted by the firing of a college professor in Beijing after his wife had a second child. Meanwhile, in 2010 China conducted its first census in 10 years; some 6 million census workers were deployed to count the country’s more than 1.3 billion people.
While the trouble spots of Xinjiang and Tibet were relatively quiet in 2010, riots broke out in Kunming, Yunnan province, in late March after police were thought to have killed a street vendor there. A string of stabbings at schools by adults raised questions about President Hu’s policy objective of a harmonious society. Eight children were killed at a school in southeastern Fujian province by a deranged man, and seven more stabbings in north-central Shanxi province followed.
China’s war on corruption resulted in several convictions in 2010, notably of Wen Qiang, a former high-ranking police and judicial official in Chongqing, who was sentenced to death in April and executed in July. Other trials in the city, involving hundreds of suspects that included dozens of public officials, revealed a culture of corruption there. One of Wen’s associates, Li Qiang, a former city council member and a wealthy businessman, was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In another case, in Beijing, a police official in charge of monitoring the Internet was given a suspended death sentence for having accepted large bribes from a software company attempting to put a rival out of business. In May, Huang Guangyu, one of China’s wealthiest businessmen, was sentenced to 14 years in jail after he was convicted of conducting business illegally, bribing public officials, and engaging in insider trading.
Southwestern China was afflicted by one of the most serious droughts in decades. Crops were destroyed on some 7 million ha (17.3 million ac) of farmland in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, and tens of millions of people there lacked adequate drinking water. The Yangtze River basin flooded during the summer, killing more than 400 people and causing widespread damage. On April 14 a magnitude-6.9 earthquake struck southeastern Qinghai province, killing nearly 3,000 people.
Pollution in various forms continued to be a serious problem. Lake Tai, west of Shanghai, one of China’s most scenic features, was fouled by an algae bloom, the third in recent years. Beijing’s notorious air pollution, which had eased during the 2008 Olympics, worsened in 2010, with decreasing numbers of blue-sky days and an air-quality index (reported by the U.S. embassy there) that occasionally exceeded the scale’s worst level of 500. Shanghai also recorded several days of high air-pollution levels after pollution-abatement measures for the expo were lifted. Much of China’s air pollution was caused by burning coal. Another important source was the increasing number of cars being sold in China. In November a Chinese official confirmed that China was the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.
China overtook Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second largest economy as annual GDP growth exceeded 10%. Its economic strength translated into increasing financial clout. Just as Japanese banks were the world’s biggest in the 1980s, by 2010 half of the world’s 10 largest banks—including the two biggest—were Chinese. Chinese businesses also increased overseas investments. Chinese firms bought 280 oil and gas companies, and leading Chinese automaker Geely purchased Volvo’s automobile-manufacturing subsidiary from Ford Motor Co. for $1.5 billion. Chinese companies also invested in luxury and recreation brands, including France’s beauty products company L’Occitane International SA and resort owner Club Med and Japan’s sports-equipment manufacturer Honma Golf Co., Ltd.
China approved its 12th Five-Year Plan in October. Diverging from the traditional emphasis of past plans on industrial output, the new document added developing China’s cultural assets and reducing greenhouse-gas emissions as national economic goals. Increasing domestic consumption was also a target. Notable infrastructure improvements in 2010 included two new lines in China’s high-speed rail network connecting Shanghai with Hangzhou and with Nanjing.
By 2010 China had an estimated 128 billionaires and 875,000 millionaires, but 16% of its 1.3 billion people lived on less than $1.25 per day. Ordinary people were hit hard in the second half of the year; the consumer price index rose by 4.7% in November alone—including a 10% increase in food prices—prompting the central government to impose price controls on grain, oil, sugar, and cotton. Housing prices also increased by some 8.6% in urban areas after the Chinese government began monitoring currency flows and requiring increased down payments to deter speculation.
In March four employees of the Australian-based mining conglomerate Rio Tinto were found guilty in a Beijing court of having paid bribes for information about iron-ore prices, and they received prison sentences of 7 to 14 years. Nonetheless, the state-owned China Power International Development Limited signed a 20-year $60 billion deal with another Australian company to supply China with 30 million tons of coal annually from mines in Queensland.
A series of worker strikes hit foreign-owned manufacturers in southern China, causing wages to rise sharply. In July Taiwan-based electronics manufacturer Hon Hai, which employed more than 800,000 people in China, increased wages 30% after a wave of employee suicides at its plants in Guangdong province. More than 100 Japanese companies operating in China were also hit by strikes, including Honda Motor Co., which ended its walkout by granting employees a 24% pay hike. Hon Hai subsidiary Foxconn, however, announced plans to move operations north to Zhengzhou in Henan province, where labour costs were significantly lower than in Guangdong. Other technology manufacturers, including Taiwan’s Acer and the U.S.’s Dell Inc. were also aiming to reduce costs by setting up major manufacturing centres in western Sichuan province.
On the technology front, U.S. search-engine giant Google Inc. announced in January that it would no longer censor search results in China and in March began directing search traffic to its Hong Kong site. In July, however, the Chinese government renewed Google’s license to operate in the country after Google agreed to stop routing searches to Hong Kong directly. In November, China’s Tianhe-1 became the world’s fastest supercomputer. During 2010 almost 100 million Chinese played online games, and goods worth some $60 billion were sold online.
China’s foreign policy for 30 years had been guided by Deng Xiaoping’s advice that it should keep a low international profile, “hiding its power and biding its time.” In 2010, though, China began to diverge from that policy in East Asia by confronting Japan over a disputed archipelago in the East China Sea and setting new core national interests in the region. In September Japan interdicted a Chinese fishing vessel near the islands (called Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan), which were claimed by China and Taiwan but were administered by Japan. After China lodged diplomatic protests and imposed an informal ban on the export of rare earth minerals used to produce high-technology goods, Japanese prosecutors released the ship’s captain and allowed him to return to China. Beijing demanded compensation and an apology. The Japanese government refused, and demonstrators protested in front of the Chinese embassy in Tokyo in October. In response, thousands of Chinese marched in Chengdu and smaller cities in Sichuan.
Following the sinking of a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea in March, China objected strenuously to U.S.–South Korean naval exercises scheduled for July in the sea, and the exercises were moved elsewhere. After North Korea shelled a South Korean island in the Yellow Sea in November, however, further U.S.–South Korean exercises were held in the sea. In public China supported North Korea, refusing to accept allegations that Pyongyang had sunk the South’s ship. North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il also visited China shortly before his son, Kim Jong-Eun, was publicly identified as the elder Kim’s successor. Privately, though, in diplomatic cables leaked to the public in November, Chinese officials suggested to the U.S. that China did not have a great deal of influence over North Korea.
The South China Sea was also an area of contention between China and the U.S. In March, Chinese officials told their U.S. counterparts that the sea—where China, Taiwan, and Vietnam had a long-running territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands—was a core national interest of China’s. In July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded by declaring at a regional security conference in Vietnam that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a U.S. national interest and offered to broker talks over the disputed islands.
China’s relations with Iran were complex. Chinese firms were suspected of supplying technology with military applications to Iran, that country being a major supplier of oil to China. At the same time, though, China generally supported the U.S. position that Iran’s nuclear ambitions were politically destabilizing. In January China launched a free-trade area with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which average tariffs were cut from 9.8% to 0.1%.
Other than issues regarding North Korea and Iran, China’s relations with the U.S. were dominated by concerns over trade and currency. In May the Obama administration imposed antidumping tariffs of 30% to 90% on Chinese exporters of steel pipe. China retaliated with similar tariffs on American chicken exports and investigated American automobile exports. Nonetheless, the total Chinese trade surplus was expected to exceed $20 billion for the year. In September the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill authorizing import duties on products from countries with undervalued currencies as the weakness of the Chinese renminbi (yuan) became a political issue in the U.S.
At the beginning of 2010, the exchange rate was about 6.83 yuan per U.S. dollar. In June China’s central bank announced a new policy of currency flexibility before the G20 summit in Toronto that month, where, as was expected, the U.S. pressured China to revalue its currency. By December the yuan had risen slightly, to about 6.65. While the U.S. wanted China to allow the yuan to appreciate more, China remained concerned that appreciation would make its exports less competitive and could affect domestic stability. At the same time, China was also concerned that the U.S. monetary policy known as quantitative easing might eat into China’s dollar-denominated investments of its foreign-currency reserves. Those reserves had reached about $2.65 trillion by the third quarter of 2010. While much of those reserves was held in U.S. bonds, China began diversifying its holdings by buying Japanese and South Korean bonds in 2010.
In early November, Pres. Hu Jintao made a state visit to France and Portugal. In France he announced orders for 102 Airbus passenger jets. China also tried, however, to pressure European countries not to send representatives to Oslo for the ceremony awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in December. In the end all EU countries attended, though Liu, imprisoned in China, did not.
Michael R. Fahey